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Climate Change 
 
Chukwumerije Okereke and Mark Charlesworth  
 
 
Introduction 
Climate change is clearly a quintessential environmental issue of the late twentieth century 
and the twenty-first century. It is in many ways the most significant concept to permeate 
environmental politics, raising ‘critical’ questions and challenges in all types of ways. The 
significance of climate change as a scientific and socio-political challenge lies in its key 
attributes as follows: first, the causes are global and implicated in virtually every human 
activity, even breathing. Second, the impacts are equally global and wide reaching with no 
jurisdiction exempted from its potential negative consequences. The ubiquity of climate 
change causing activities entails that a huge effort in technical, social and economic terms is 
needed in order to achieve meaningful reduction in GHG emissions. Indeed, the structural 
and social reorganization required by societies to effectively mitigate and adapt to climate 
change has been described as unprecedented in human history (Newell and Paterson 2010). 
The third unique attribute of climate change is the massive inequity in its causes and impacts 
both within and across states. Essentially, the poor, who have been least responsible for 
causing climate change, are the ones most affected by its negative impacts (Okereke 2008; 
2010a; 2010b; 2011). Fourthly, the problem is long term but also could be abrupt, at least 
regionally. This not only complicates questions of responsibility; it also means that there are 
few, if any solutions with immediately evident effects. If tipping points are excluded from 
analysis, the long time span between action and results creates a dis-incentive for action but 
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also raises difficult moral questions about responsibility to future generations. To wit, what 
moral status should we accord future generations and to what extent should moderation or 
sacrifice be expected of current generations when they will not be alive to reap all the 
material benefits of their actions? These challenges are further compounded by the fifth 
unique attribute of climate change. This is the fact that there remains so much uncertainty 
about the effects, if less so the causes – a fact which can be used as a basis for more 
precaution and radical action or conversely an excuse for delay or inaction (Charlesworth and 
Okereke 2009). 
 
It is easy to see from the above why climate change has been described as a super-wicked 
problem (Levin et al 2010) – one which poses significant challenges to environmental public 
policy making. At the same time climate change has also resulted in some of the most 
significant challenges but also important new concepts, policies and institutions in 
environmental co-operation at the international level (Okereke et al 2012). For these reasons, 
it will be difficult to imagine any discussion on critical environmental politics that would not 
place climate change at the centre of analysis.   
 
Climate change challenges business-as-usual politics and poses intractable problems for long-
standing approaches to economic management, regulation, commerce, ethics, and 
international co-operation. We trace the transformation of climate change from purely an 
objective phenomenon to an idea interpreted and contested through a variety of political, 
economic, cultural and ethical prisms. While climate change may have provided the best 
inspiration and platform for critical environmental politics yet, it has also revealed the 
considerable embeddedness of prevailing managerialist socio-economic ideologies and 
practices. Building in particular on the analysis of MacIntyre (1990) on virtue ethics we 
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indicate a way for research and real climate politics to go beyond the sterility that has beset 
climate governance and negotiations. 
 
Core ideas  
As stated, climate change implicates a large number of different concepts. A few of these are 
relatively new but the majority are pre-existing ideas which are amplified. Below, we 
elaborate on some of these concepts indicating the contestations associated with them, and 
how these have been used in relation to climate politics.  
 
A key concept in climate politics is attribution. The central question is how much of climate 
change can be attributed to human activities rather than being ‘natural’ variation? This 
question is significant and has implications for other dimensions of climate change, not the 
least because if climate change is mostly naturally induced rather than anthropogenic, then 
both response strategies and politics are principally around adaptation, rather than reducing 
emissions.   
 
Experiments demonstrate that more greenhouse gases such as CO2 and methane increase the 
greenhouse effect already present in the atmosphere (IPCCWG1 2007). Direct measurements 
since the 1950s demonstrate the amounts of greenhouse gases have been increasing (ibid 
2007). There is little controversy until this point. The controversy of climate science centres 
on the wider consequences of these increases in gas concentrations, including on the global 
temperature. Broadly two approaches are taken to resolve this question. The first is to look at 
records such as the concentrations of gases trapped in air bubbles in ice cores and correlating 
these to data that indicate temperatures at these times in the past (ibid 2007). Some of this 
research indicates perhaps as much as an 18 degree Celsius change in average temperature in 
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as little as ten years regionally, when a tipping point is crossed to a new state that then 
persists for 1000s of years (Steffensen et al 2008). This is less controversial, though 
interpretation of the data is not without its difficulties (e.g. Tingley et al 2012). The second, 
more controversial approach is using models of the climate or planet to predict what 
temperatures will be in the future (IPCCWG1 2007). Some of this research suggests that 
existing emissions already commit the climate system to perhaps thousands of years of 
human created change (inertia) (IPCCSR 2001, 16-21; Armour and Roe, 2011) with 
unimagined tipping points (Charlesworth and Okereke 2010) potentially being crossed at any 
moment. The two approaches combined have so far provided the basis for much of the 
climate stabilization targets at the various regimes of climate governance, across geographical 
scales.  
 
Both climate sceptics and believers in man-made climate change recognise the ultimate 
importance of the debate around attribution and have made it a key focus in advancing their 
arguments for and against climate action. Years of painstaking work has been done by 
independent researchers, national academies of science and international scientific bodies to 
establish exactly how much of global warming and climate change is due to human activity. 
The results of these works are scrupulously scrutinised and regularly deployed in the debate 
about climate change. These works have caused an overwhelming consensus among the 
scientific community that man-made climate change is a reality. However, climate sceptics 
continue to contest the methodology and validity of dominant scientific opinion about 
attribution. They argue that natural sources of change including changes in energy from the 
sun have far more influence on climate change than mainstream climate science indicates 
(Booker 2009; Durkin 2007; Meyer 2012). They also argue that climate change is within 
normal climatic variation and that talk of catastrophic climate change is fictional and 
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unjustified (Booker 2009; Durkin 2007; Meyer 2012). It should be noted that tipping points 
and their policy implications are typically barely considered by sceptics – indeed even in 
mainstream climate literature the consideration of tipping points is minimal.  
 
Many people in Europe believe that climate change is man-made, signifying that the climate 
sceptics have lost the debate in these countries. In North America however, these ‘Merchants 
of Doubt’ (Oreskes and Conway 2010) have had more success as perhaps up to half of the 
population does not believe in anthropogenic climate change (ibid 2010). Even in Europe, 
climate scepticism was temporarily revived in the wake of ‘climategate’ which involved the 
hacking of emails of the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, and the 
allegation that scientists manipulated climate data and attempted to suppress critics (Scruggs 
and Benegal 2012). Although hardly any credible science now denies man-made climate 
change, raising doubt about attribution remains the key point of attack in popular media and 
political circles by those wishing to challenge radical and urgent action against climate 
change (Latour 2004; Oreskes and Conway 2010, Scruggs and Benegal 2012). 
 
Next, in the discussion we turn to two other concepts – robustness and prediction – both of 
which are closely linked to attribution. Here, the first key question is how robust is the Earth 
System; to what extent can it withstand stress from human activities and can science 
effectively predict the limits of stress that the Earth will withstand?  There is a lot of literature 
that questions the extent to which climate modelling can be relied on to provide an accurate 
account of the complex global climate system with all its feedback mechanisms (Knutti 2008; 
Myanna 2005). Drawing from this literature, some climate sceptics argue that the Earth 
System is far more robust and able to cope with climate variations than is suggested by 
mainstream science (Goklany 2008). But while climate sceptics criticize dominant climate 
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science for going too far, there are others who argue that mainstream science does not go 
nearly far enough (Anderson and Bows 2008; Schneider 2008). These scholars argue that 
mainstream prediction and probabilistic science makes unwarranted optimistic assumptions 
about the robustness of the Earth System; for example in presuming that the Earth System 
will continue to absorb the large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions provided for in the lax 
stabilization targets agreed within institutions of global climate policy making such as the 
Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC (Anderson and Bows 2008; Harvey 2007; Oppenheimer 
2005).  
 
One of the main reasons for establishing the IPCC in the late 1980s had been to provide 
conclusive scientific statements about these controversial issues and serve as a definitive 
voice in communicating the science of climate change (Agrawala 1998). The basic process 
that the IPCC has followed is reviewing the vast body of published evidence, in five year 
cycles. Because of the political sensitivity of IPCC documents, painstaking care is taken to 
calibrate the language of the reports. But while the IPCC has indeed become the authoritative 
voice in defining the standard view of climate science, controversy remains over its findings 
and recommendations (see Forsyth, this volume). Some continue to insist that the IPCC is 
nearly as much a political as it is a scientific body (Gough and Shackley 2001; Grundmann 
2007). A frequent point of attack is usually the Synthesis Reports or Summaries for Policy 
Makers (SPM), the wording of which many argue are determined by politicians rather than 
scientists (Grundmann 2007; Miller and Edwards 2001). It is indeed a fact that some 
governments such as Saudi Arabia have in the past been known to engage in ‘wording wars’: 
tactics aimed at watering-down the tone of urgency in the SPM (Depledge 2005; Paterson 
1996). Yet even the IPCC itself admits that many of its recommendations are based on 
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probabilistic evidence and that many important questions about climate change may never be 
conclusively answered.  
 
A key concept that emerges in the context of the impossibility of absolute certainty about the 
robustness of the Earth System is that of risk (Oppenheimer 2005; see also Pellizzoni this 
volume). If indeed science is unable to determine precisely the capacity or limits of the Earth 
System, then what is the safe level of risk that should be permitted in climate policy making 
and on what basis should such a decision be made?  Many economic libertarians have argued 
that the negative economic implications of huge cuts in carbon emissions far outweigh 
potential environmental benefits (Goklany 2008; Michaels 2012). They point to the strong 
links between carbon emissions and economic development and argue that the inconvenience 
of climate change is a rational price to pay for continued economic success and the 
improvement of the material quality of life for millions around the world (Goklany 2008). As 
the argument goes, even if global warming is caused solely by the burning of fossil fuels, 
restricting their use would have more damaging effects on the world economy than the 
increases in global temperature. Of course this argument is opposed by many who argue that 
early action to reduce emissions would help avoid much greater economic costs later, and 
would reduce the risk of catastrophic, irreversible change (Stern 2007). Governments have 
tended to rely on economists, with their standard techniques such as cost benefit analysis and 
contingent valuation, to work out the economic risks and benefits of tackling climate change 
now as opposed to deferring action to the future. But among economists, there is serious 
disagreement about what scale of effort is needed, the time for deployment of actions that 
makes the most economic sense, and how to allocate resources for climate mitigation and 
adaptation. The key issue in this debate is about the discount rate that should be used in 
economic and contingent valuation of climate change, which in ordinary terms quite simply 
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boils down to differing views about the costs, risks and benefits of taking early action versus 
delaying action to a future date (Ackerman et al. 2009; Barker 2008; Nordhaus 2007; Pielke 
2007; Stern 2007; Tol and Yohe 2009). 
 
It turns out then that debates about risk, regardless of the technical jargon involved, are 
essentially managerialist disputes about how to resolve different conceptions of value (Adger 
et al 2011; Neumayer 2007). It is basically about how much of climate and broader 
environmental governance should be predicated on precaution or utility; the basis on which 
utility should be calculated and how to reconcile different notions of utility. As stated, these 
are fundamental normative questions which neither climate science nor economic valuation 
can answer (see Wapner, this volume). As a no less eminent person than the IPCC chief 
scientist, Dr Pachauri admits, ‘dangerous climate change is no doubt a question that must be 
decided on the basis of value judgment’. ‘What is dangerous’, he says, ‘is essentially a matter 
of what society decides’ (Pachauri 2006: 3). Hence even among believers in man-made 
climate change, there are deep disagreements about what scale of effort is needed and the best 
approach to addressing the risks imposed by climate change. One manifestation of this 
disagreement at the international regime level is the politics around stabilization targets. The 
Small Island States are aggressively pushing for a 1.5
o
C target as the official goal of 
international climate policy (Farbotko and McGregor 2010). The EU supports a 2
o
C target 
(which some argue is actually a political rather than scientific target) (Anderson and Bows 
2008). Meanwhile, many of the climate laggards and their demagogues would prefer that 
international climate policy documents make no reference at all to stabilization targets (Cato 
Institute 2009).  
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Differences of this nature, which are underpinned by different perceptions of risk, account for 
much of the misunderstanding, wrangling and recrimination in international climate politics 
(Bodansky 2010, 2011; Death, this volume; Okereke and Dooley 2010; Okereke 2008; 
Rajamani 2011). For example, on Saturday 17 October 2009, in the run up to the Copenhagen 
meeting, the government of the small island of Maldives stunned the world by holding a 
cabinet meeting underwater, to highlight the threat of global warming to the low-lying Indian 
Ocean nation (BBC, 2009). Soon after the meeting the president accused the West of looking 
idly on while the Maldives and other Small Island States faced extinction as a result of 
climate change. Many other poor and climate vulnerable countries have also consistently 
argued that whilst they are already suffering massive impacts of climate change, much of the 
population and governments of the rich West continue to treat climate change as a future 
threat (Methmann and Oels this volume).  
 
A fundamental weakness of the climate regime frequently noted by scholars is that 
mainstream policy ‘underemphasizes, or more often ignores completely, the symbolic aspects 
of settlements, places and risks to them’ (Adger et al 2011: 2). The mainstream approach also 
‘discounts the ethics of intergenerational equity’ (Barker 2008:173), and tends to ‘reduce all 
risks to aggregate measures of human welfare’ (Adger et al 2011: 2). This approach, 
moreover, it is argued, cannot deal with the risk of irreversible changes nor the 
incommensurability of market and non-instrumental aspects of environmental and social 
change (Ackerman et al 2009; Neumayer 2007)  
 
But it is not strictly speaking correct to say that climate policy ignores non-instrumental 
components of the environment. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that mainstream 
frameworks ignore these components and risks, so long as they are being borne by the poor 
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and underprivileged groups in the global community (see Bond, this volume). These are 
mostly the ones that have no power to press their claims in national and international policy 
making arenas. Norms and rules about what and how to conserve are after all not pre-
ordained choices governed by rigid technical science. They are ultimately political decisions 
over which the powerful regularly exert influence at both national and international levels 
(Roberts and Parks 2007). In the final analysis then, climate change is about fairness, justice 
and equity (Okereke 2008). These concepts are more pertinent to climate politics when one 
recalls that the people who are primarily responsible for causing the problem are not the ones 
that are bearing much of the negative impacts of the change.  
  
Key thinkers 
The first important set of thinkers are those who highlighted the anthropogenic nature of 
climate change and took the call for urgent action into the mainstream political space, popular 
media and public consciousness. Here, a leading figure is NASA scientist James Hansen. 
Hansen helped to raise the profile of climate change and catalyze political action when he 
testified to a committee of the US Senate in 1988, claiming in his testimony that ‘the 
abnormally hot weather plaguing our nation’ was clearly due to global warming. Another 
leading voice was the then-Prime Minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher, who in her address 
to the UN General Assembly, long before climate change became an issue fought from 
behind fixed ideological lines, described climate change as a challenge that in ‘future is likely 
to be more fundamental and more widespread than anything we have known hitherto’ 
(Thatcher 1989). The prospect, she said, ‘is a new factor in human affairs… comparable in its 
implications to the discovery of how to split the atom. Indeed, its results could be even more 
far-reaching.’  
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Thatcher’s speech helped galvanize action in United Nations including the establishment of 
the IPCC and the UNFCCC.  Other advocates who helped embed the notion of anthropogenic 
climate change into public consciousness include Sir John Houghton who was the co-chair of 
the IPCC scientific assessment working group and the lead editor of the first three IPCC 
reports. Sir David King (2004), then the Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK government, 
attracted widespread attention to the issue when he said that climate change was a more 
serious threat than terrorism. He continues to be a powerful voice, galvanizing action on 
climate change at national and international levels. Professor Mike Hulme was one of the first 
to highlight the impact of climate change on the social and agricultural systems in Africa. His 
work (2001) showed that climate change was probably already having a far-reaching impact 
and increasing the vulnerability of those exposed to a host of other socioeconomic problems.  
 
But the works of these scholars have not gone unchallenged. A leading climate sceptic was 
Bjørn Lomborg. His argument was that climate change was a real problem but that others are 
more important on the basis of his cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) (Lomborg 2001; c.f. 
Goklany 2008). Lomborg campaigned against the Kyoto Protocol and other measures to cut 
carbon emissions in the short-term, and argued that money should instead be spent on 
research and development for longer-term environmental solutions, and on other important 
world problems such as AIDS, malaria and malnutrition. His limited treatment of how CBA 
handles thresholds in the Earth System, and the fact that other CBAs reach different 
conclusions, limits the usefulness of this research. However, this and similar CBAs have been 
influential in affecting the views of public figures such as Nigel Lawson (2009), George W 
Bush, and companies that oppose action to reduce CO2 emissions (Friel 2010). 
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Although as stated, there remain some voices against the need for global action on climate 
change, in fact the vast majority of academic discourse has long moved beyond questioning 
climate change to focusing on what the best approaches are for addressing the challenge. One 
can therefore organise the key thinking around the three main broad approaches or areas of 
focus: (i) institutionalism; (ii) critical perspectives; and (iii) ethical approaches. The rest of 
the section discusses these perspectives and highlights the works of key scholars.  
 
The first is the institutionalist or managerialist approach which focuses on the mechanisms 
and procedures through which nation states and other key actors (e.g. corporations) in the 
absence of a world government can best co-operate to address the problem of climate change. 
Two leading thinkers on the institutional dimensions of climate change are Frank Biermann 
(2001;  2007; 2012; Biermann and Bauer 2005) and David Victor (2001).  
Institutional scholars view climate change as an international problem that is best tackled 
through inter-state co-operation.  They take the view that climate change is a collective action 
problem and that the most rational course of action is, therefore for states to collaborate to 
share the burdens and benefits of the cooperation entailed in addressing the problem.  
Institutionalists emphasize the prevalence of inter-state co-operative arrangements and the 
tendencies of states to regulate their practices in a fairly well co-coordinated manner given 
the right incentive structure (Keohane and Victor 2011; Young, 1994).  The focus therefore is 
mainly on exploring ways to make international institutions for climate governance more 
effective both in terms of emission reduction and the allocation of costs (Keohane and Victor 
2011; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Victor 2001). Because states are seen as the main actors or 
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agency for governance as well as the primary locus of authority, there is less emphasis on the 
needs and potential agency of individuals, communities and other sub-national entities. 
Critically, the managerialist approach emphasizes the preeminence of economic efficiency as 
the central guiding principle in climate policy making (Victor, 2001). Economic efficiency is 
in turn mostly sought through reliance on the capitalist free market system. Biermann (2001; 
2007; 2012, Biermann and Bauer 2005) has authored several highly influential contributions 
focusing on various aspects of institutions for international climate governance.  He is well 
known for pioneering the concept of ‘earth system governance’ in 2005, which has evolved 
into a major global research programme in this field.  His research identifies issues of 
architecture, regime interplay and fragmentation, allocation and regime stability as some of 
the key aspects needing more attention in order to advance effective international cooperation 
on climate change and other environmental problems. Some of his more practical 
recommendations which have inspired much debate in the literature include strengthening the 
UN system through the creation of a UN or world environmental organization, the creation of 
a UN Parliamentary Assembly and empowering existing bodies like the United Nations 
Environmental Programme with monitoring and sanctioning abilities (cf. Ivanova 2012) (see 
Death, this volume).    
David  Victor is renowned for his argument that the best way for nation states to deal with 
climate change is through the use of market instruments especially emission trading (Victor, 
2001).  This view, supported by many liberal economic scholars, has been heavily influential 
in climate policy making at global, regional and national levels with a lot of focus given to 
market instruments such as cap and trade (EU, Australia, group of states in the US), the clean 
development mechanism and international carbon offset (Barker 2008; Nordhaus 2007; 
Pielke 2007; Stern 2007). More recently and especially following the perception that the 
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Kyoto Protocol has not been effective in helping states reduce emissions, some 
institutionalists have begun to call for less “top down” and more “bottom up” approaches to 
global climate policy (Rayner 2010; Verweij et al 2006). The idea here is not to abandon 
states and the market as the key institutions for climate action. Rather, it is de-emphasize 
target-setting at the UN level and to encourage a raft of voluntary actions at the state level 
including especially green technology innovation and emission trading. 
 
The managerialist approach to climate change governance is criticized by scholars from the 
Marxist inspired critical perspectives with Mathew Paterson (2000), Peter Newell (2001), and 
Larry Lohmann (2006; 2010) as some of the key thinkers. Here, the starting point is to 
highlight the relationship between the dominant capitalist economic system and climate 
change. Furthermore, critical scholars question the suitability of the state-based system as the 
main platform for addressing the problem of climate change. Paterson and Newell have 
argued in several places that “a perspective which starts from the role of the state in 
promoting capital accumulation can much better explain the content both of state policies and 
of particular international agreements” on climate change (Newell and Paterson 1998: 679; cf. 
Paterson 2000; 2007; Newell 2001; Newell and Paterson 2010).  Critical voices also 
emphasize the structural power of capital, the role of historical materialism and the incredible 
ability of business to influence prevailing approaches to climate governance at both state and 
the international levels (Clapp 2005; Levy and Egan 2003). In addition to pointing out that a 
capitalist or market-oriented approach to climate change is ineffective in achieving realisable 
emission reduction and addressing the long term challenge of climate change, Larry 
Lohmann is noted for his emphasis that the core market instruments for climate governance 
such as carbon trading results in the further dispossession of the poor and the transfer of 
wealth from the global South to richer global North (Lohmann 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010).  The 
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conclusion is that climate change is caused by the competition for resources engendered by 
the interstate system and the values underpinning the consumer capitalist economy. Hence, 
that it is futile to expect that climate change can be solved through the same system and 
processes and that caused it. But while critical scholars are very insightful in their critique of 
“climate capitalism” and the managerislist approach, they are less clear about the alternatives 
for addressing climate change.  
 
An important apparent shift of emphasis has been made by key authors Newell and Paterson 
in their book entitled Climate Capitalism (2010). While acknowledging the problematic 
relationship between capitalism and climate change, they nonetheless suggest the dominance 
of capitalism makes it difficult to see how else to deal with climate change. They argue that 
the best chance to address climate change lies in mobilising and greening capitalist 
institutions and instruments such as the carbon market, and they conclude that ‘[c]apitalism 
of one form or another will provide the context in which near-term solutions to climate 
change will have to be found’ (p.161). In contrast, authors like Larry Lohmann (2010) remain 
adamant that it is inherently impossible to reorganise capitalism to accommodate genuine 
environmental solutions, because capitalism depends for its survival on primitive 
accumulation and in externalizing the environmental cost of production.  
 
The third main approach is the more overt discussions of the distributive and ethical aspects 
of climate change. Leading thinkers here include Andrew Dobson (1998), Benito Muller 
(2001; 2002), and Dale Jamison (1992). Authors on the distributive dimensions of climate 
change focus on the differentiation in the cause and impact of climate change both within and 
across states. As stated in the previous sections, the core argument is that climate change is 
essentially a justice problem because it involves the rich imposing their burden on the poor. 
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Following, it is argued that questions of justice are imperative both in finding effective 
solutions to climate change and in getting an agreement that will be widely acceptable 
internationally. The works of Andy Dobson (1998; 1999) on the relationship between various 
notions of sustainability and different conceptions of justice have inspired a generation of 
scholars to explore equity implications of prevailing climate policy and alternative 
arrangements for achieving climate justice at domestic level at the realm of global climate 
regime, with emphasis on North-South climate justice (Garvey 2008; Okereke 2008; 2010a, 
2010b; Gardiner 2011).  
  
While a lot of work focuses on temporal and inter-temporal distributional implications of 
climate change, others highlight the general limitations of the dominant utilitarian economic 
philosophy and values that underpin conventional climate policy (Attfield 2003; Earth 
Charter 2000; Engel and Engel 1990; Palmer and Finlay 2003; Sandler and Cafaro 2005). 
The core argument is that drastic changes in the global environment raise fundamental 
questions about the dominant modes of relationship between human beings as well as their 
relationship to the environment and its non-human content. Specifically, it is argued that 
climate change is fundamentally caused by the quest for economic growth, and associated 
values such as greed, consumerism, competition and man’s intent to dominate nature. The 
suggestion is to replace these utilitarian ethics with a broad range of other cultural and 
spiritual perspectives especially those that privilege precaution, moderation and sacrifice 
(Shaw 2009). 
 
To be clear, climate ethics scholars do not contest the importance of economic information or 
effective legal frameworks in environmental decision-making. Nor is it suggested that 
rational self-interest is not a strong motivation for individual and public action. What is 
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contested is the ‘more grandiose claim’ (Jamieson 1992: 143) that utilitarian economics 
provides the most important benchmark for environmental policy decision-making.  In other 
words, that an exclusively managerialist approach to climate change is bound to fail in that 
such an approach avoids a critical engagement with the underlying values and systems – e.g. 
greed, consumerism, unequal resource distribution, unfettered capitalism and economic 
liberal individualism, etc.—that are at the heart of current drastic changes in the environment. 
 
Critical potential 
Climate change offers much in the way of critical potential. Conceptually, it is perhaps the 
paradigm case which challenges the prevailing view of ‘nature’ as something that can and 
should be dominated to provide maximum material comfort. It presses the case for a more 
humble outlook or enlightened anthropocentrism that was dominant in society before New 
Atlantis. This view recognizes the need for moderation, humility and precaution 
(Charlesworth and Okereke 2010). Climate change has raised serious questions about the 
extent to which humans can externalise the cost of economic production and consumption 
without undermining the very basis of human existence itself. 
 
Unimagined tipping points in the Earth System and climate system raise profound questions 
about the notion of risk. Where there is not actual data from experience (and perhaps even 
where there is), basing policy decisions entirely on utilitarian cost benefit analyses entails a 
significant leap of faith. Although nearly all political decisions entails some form of 
uncertainty and risk calculation, the prevailing approach which privileges market economics 
over intrinsic value of nature constitutes a major hindrance to addressing long term climate 
change.  
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In general, contemporary policy processes tend to have very short time horizons related to 
elections, media attention and perhaps most importantly the quarterly financial returns of 
stock-market listed companies and the instantaneous whims of financial speculation. It is 
instructive that calls for urgent action on climate change have all but been put on the back 
burner since the onset of the global economic crisis in late 2008. Recent events in Canada, 
Australia and the United States demonstrate clearly that government policies and action on 
climate change is contingent on political expediency. Canada pulled out of the Kyoto 
Protocol and has aggressively encouraged oil mining from tar sand in a bid to boost its 
flagging economy. The Australian government had its proposals for a carbon tax drastically 
altered, following campaigns and threats from the coal industry. The first Obama 
administration had to ‘park’ proposed legislation on climate change to secure the support of 
the Republican-dominated senate for his financial and economic reforms. The long-term 
nature of climate change makes short-term approach to policy very unsuitable and ineffective 
(Anderson and Bows 2008). Even if an assumption is made that there will be no abrupt 
climate changes, it should be noted that the burdens of increases in global mean temperature, 
droughts, floods and other extreme weather events are already on many of the current global 
poor who have contributed the least to climate change (Oppenheimer 2005; Sundaraman 
1995). Given the actual harm occurring now, which is attributed to climate change, the 
wealth of literature that discusses questions around climate change and future generations is 
perhaps intrinsically ‘academic’, and is even more so when the literature tends to use lack of 
knowledge of future generations’ preferences almost as an excuse to maintain their own 
ideological positions – often little more than business as usual (c.f. Böhm and Dabhi 2011; 
Harvey 2006, 2010; Lohmann 2006; 2008). 
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As we have already seen, the conceptual questions raised by climate change immediately 
raise ideological questions. In particular, difficulties in framing markets make the 
marketization of carbon difficult to justify unless substantial emission reductions can be 
unquestionably demonstrated prior to that marketization (Böhm and Dabhi 2009, 2011; 
Bumpus and Liverman 2008). The experience of carbon marketization only reinforces these 
issues (see Paterson, this volume). There are indications that existing carbon markets have 
made rich people richer and not reduced emissions (Böhm and Dabhi 2009; 2011; Lohmann 
2006; 2010). Questions related to other markets are more complex, but unless they are local 
exchange subsistence markets there is a likelihood they end up promoting increased resource 
consumption and associated emissions (Lohmann 2008; 2009). These observations further 
reinforce the importance of questions of justice (see Bond, this volume). If justice is not seen 
as to each according to what the capitalist market dictates, then the rich getting richer through 
relatively little work, whilst the poor and vulnerable get more exposed to climate risks, must 
surely be unjust (Okereke and Schroeder 2009; Okereke 2011). Henry Shue puts it aptly 
when he said, ‘whatever justice entails, it is clearly not justice to ask the poor to sell their 
blankets so that the rich can keep their jewelleries’ (1992: 453). Yet it needs to be 
acknowledged that while the intuitive appeal to climate justice at the global level is strong, 
outlining what exactly it entails and how that might be achieved in the anarchical inter-state 
system is a very challenging task. 
 
Arising from all of this, there has been much discussion of how relevant states are for a 
global issue such as climate change (Okereke et al 2009; Paterson, 2000; see Kuehls, this 
volume). As stated, the competition for resource accumulation engendered by the logic of the 
state and the related imperative to protect domiciled companies has been identified as a major 
cause of global environmental degradation (Paterson 2000).  However, states can set a legal 
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(soft or hard law) framework in which companies and capitalism work, in a way that no other 
actor can (Barry and Eckersley 2005; Eckersley 2004). Yet, since state authorities achieve 
their mandates to govern through democratic elections and are mostly interested in their re 
(elections), it is evident that states’ ability and willingness to challenge vested interests will 
depend to a large degree on the measure of support they get from citizens. Hence a critical 
question is really to what extent climate change can serve as a mobilizing force for global 
citizens to press for fundamental changes in the structure and functioning of the prevalent 
economic order (see Price et al, this volume).  
 
If the underpinnings of such utilitarian economics struggle to provide a basis for effective 
climate policy, to what else can we look? MacIntyre (1990) powerfully argues that virtue 
provides a better approach to dealing with complex political and environmental problems 
than dominant free market capitalism and associated economic cost benefit analysis. 
Developing from MacIntyre, one approach could be the elevation of virtue ethics which 
emphasizes precaution, moderation and sacrifice (Shaw, 2009). One common criticism is that 
ideas of virtue vary widely between cultures (e.g. Statman 1997: 20-23; Louden 1984). 
However, for environment and development questions the Earth Charter (2000), Engel and 
Engel (1990), Palmer and Finlay (2003) among others suggest sufficient similarity to enable 
talk of a global virtue tradition. This tradition sees greed, selfishness, gluttony vices and 
justice, wisdom, courage and moderation as cardinal virtues that resonate across cultures (cf. 
Sandler and Cafaro 2005). Yet, even on a broad level translating these virtues into practical 
policy making at the global level cannot by any means be seen as an easy task. 
 
Conclusion 
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Climate change raises critical questions that much theoretical and practical (environmental) 
politics tends to ignore or under emphasize. Firstly, despite widely appreciated shortcomings, 
much of climate discourse and policy continues to elevate probabilistic prediction science as 
the basis for global climate public policy (see Forsyth, this volume). To worsen matters, the 
blind faith in prediction is matched by a strong ideological commitment to utilitarian 
economic tools as the basis for deciding environmental value and actions that are worthwhile 
in saving the planet. Despite ample evidence of poor performance, governments are fixed on 
the idea of commodifying carbon and constructing different types of carbon market as 
inevitable tools in solving climate change (see Paterson, this volume). As ever, conventional 
wisdom remains that there is no alternative to markets. The result appears to be little more 
than business as usual with plenty of rhetoric and little in the form of adequate action.   
 
Moreover, the four or five year perspectives promoted by electoral cycles means that 
representative democracy has difficulty taking a long term perspective, particularly when the 
purchase of media coverage to engage voters means that candidates literally owe a debt to the 
large corporations that tend to have sufficient disposable income. Thus forms of democracy 
that can take a longer view and are also better able to deal with difficulties in predicting 
climate change appear to be needed. Such forms of directly democratic policy making have 
received extensive attention (Dryzek 1987, 1990; see also Hinton, this volume). That 
participative policy processes are mandated by international agreements including Agenda 21 
(United Nations 1992) adds to the impetus for these processes to complement existing 
representative (electoral) democratic processes.  
 
But in the absence of strong global institutions for governing sustainability (see Baker and 
Death, this volume) the burden of climate change continues to fall disproportionately on 
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those that have least caused it. Climate change thus brings questions of global justice to the 
fore (see Bond, this volume); it also suggests the need to go beyond utilitarian ethics and 
unbridled anthropocentrism (see McShane, this volume). While the suggestion to accord non-
human nature moral rights as implied in ecocentrism may be going too far, there is certainly 
the need to embrace ethical approaches that emphasize the unity of all beings. Some form of 
cautious anthropocentrism or of what Welchman calls ‘enlightened anthropocentrism’ 
(Welchman 1999)), should be sufficient to promote more care and prudence in our dealings 
with nature (see Wapner, this volume). 
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Useful websites 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change http://www.ipcc.ch/  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change http://unfccc.int/  
The 350 campaign: http://www.350.org/  
A commentary site on climate science by working climate scientists 
http://www.realclimate.org/   
Global Governance Project: http://www.glogov.org/ 
Earth System Governance Project: http://www.earthsystemgovernance.org/ 
Climate Ethics blog: http://rockblogs.psu.edu/climate/  
 
